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Abstract 
The internal reasons of the deceptive air crashes were studied for the purpose of explanation its nature to reduce the 
accidents and the injuries. An approach of synthetic comparison is deployed. The Concorde aircraft accident was 
analyzed detailed to recognize what the real human error is. All the passengers were killed in the crash. Other similar 
accidents relating aircraft DC-10, Tu-154 and Tu-144 were discussed about the risk perception of the pilots and 
system. Certain higher survival rate was reached in these cases. Then the conclusion is obtained that the real problem 
is the lack of pre-sight for the risk in operation and system management relating to the pilots and the organizations. 
The conclusion suggests some changes be made in complex system management regulations and in thinking mode for 
the general applications to safety. 
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1.  Introduction  
Some severe air accidents show the lack of pre-sight and the similar accidents may occur again if 
certain problem is not solved effectively. The air transportation systems are of a kind of complex at the 
structure and the functions. The air transportation lain the safety management important on operations, and 
many precautions are adopted in regulations. However the air accidents occur occasionally by causing 
heavy loses. Some airliners go smoothing without major accidents and some are in the trouble of frequent 
accidents. The safety is commonly concerned, and is the focus of the systems management. The pre-sight 
in the system is vital from the cases below. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAPIE Organization 
Committee. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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2. The Pre-sight Study 
Each air liners works on different level of standards producing differential result in the safety records. 
But some cases are not easy to meter by the standards, as they met the regulations at appearance. The 
management of the flight, companies or the whole aviation system is the matters of techniques and science 
behind which stay its own principals. The aircraft counteract the gravity and the drag as well as rain, fog, 
etc. The gravity acts on every thing on earth always, good to human, but challenging to the aircrafts. 
2.1 The Study of Typical Accidents 
Some severe air accidents are typical for study, as they gave lessons which are not learned smartly. 
The Concorde Accident 
The Concorde aircraft was one of the supersonic air transporters for passenger fights. A series 
coincident event led it to destiny in 25th, July 2000. The Concorde aircraft was planed the flight Paris-New 
York at 13:30. The pilot found the second reverser was in malfunction, and then he required the 
maintenance engineer to replace it. The engineer told the captain that the maintenance work would delay 
the flight, and it might be airworthy if not repaired according to the minimum equipment list (MEL), as the 
airliners regard punctual as a reputation. 
Generally an aircraft takes a few legs a day for flights, and a delay may cause a chain of other delays. 
But the long range flight takes only one or two legs a day. The Concorde was not in the trouble of delay for 
this reason, and it takes only one return that day. 
The captain considered the safety first and then insisted the replacement of the second reverser. As a 
result, this flight was delayed more than one hour. 
Just at its rotation during the rolling, a sheet metal, which was dropped from a DC -10 aircraft flight 5 
minutes before, was rolled by the Concorde left main wheel. The wheel was explored causing the first and 
second engine stop working and the leakage of the fuel tank, with flames. The Concorde aircraft was 
pulled up keeping its climbing, and it crashed a minute later, with 109 onboard and 4 in a hotel killed. 
The investigation report draws a conclusion of foreign object destruction (FOD). According to the 
international air transportation regulation it was responsible of who drops the objects. The report just 
suggests the pilots should obtain more training from the flight simulators, for the sense of lateral 
acceleration. The report did not attribute the accidents to the pilots, air traffic controllers (ATC) and any 
organizations[1].
The FOD was the first thread of the accident. However the two people, pilots who fly (PF) and the 
ATC, were the last attribution, considered here. 
Disregarding the suit and the regulations, it should be discussed how to prevent this crash, as the 
similar events may occur in the future frequently. 
(1) The aircraft with flames ought not to be allowed to takeoff, because it was not airworthy. But not a 
rule did say so before, no training either. Both of ATC and PF did not know what to do.  
A Chinese idiom says “fire and water is destructive, and fire is order”. And to the Concorde aircraft 
situation, emergency actions must have had been taken flawlessly. 
(2) The first and second engine failed to work due to the debris of the tire exploration, then the gravity 
and the drag could not be overcome with the remained power, the takeoff should be aborted from any 
consciousness.  
The air transport systems should be controlled. The system controllers should adapt themselves to the 
changing conditions. Obviously the ATC and the PF did not act according to the circumstance. They were 
not adaptive. 
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The Concorde in question was controllable at first, in rotation and in climbing, and then it was out of 
control. The precious time and chance were lost. If it were not lost, it could have landed anywhere inside 
and outside the runway or the airport according to [1-2]. 
(3) The pilots in cockpit knew only malfunction of engine, but not the fault mode and severity. 
According to the training manual if the speed reaches V1, it should be pulled up. But at that time, a voice 
of “stop” in the cockpit was called out, and it was not accepted by the captain. This is a case of typical 
crew resource management (CRM) problem. 
(4) The view of ATC in the control tower was good. The flames were beneath. ATC should emit order 
to stop its pulling up, but instead he emitted only a notice of fire. 
Any pilot should stop the aircraft if he got the sight. As the fire is not encountered frequently, it is a rare 
and horror event. Though not severity was transmitted, just the “fire” notice was enough to quit the takeoff. 
It can only be seemed non-coordinate, although the name Concorde is coordinate. 
(5) At that time the airport completed rehearse of a fire rescue, and then the runway was not checked at 
that time. The airport not fulfills its support functions, but in the fact of destructing this time. 
Therefore it is believed here that the pulling up was a wrong action, and the ATC should order it stop. 
The miserable wreckage made the ATC too sorry.  
Other regret existed also as the follows: 
(1) The replaced second reverser could not have been used anymore. 
Originally, the replacement was the omen suggesting its strong function. The captain’s idea originally 
was to keep its landing deceleration symmetry, without thinking of use it in-advance at take off. At this 
fault if this reverser was deployed in the takeoff abortion, it would have had the big function of decrease 
the braking distance in about 200 meters, which might produce much better safety benefits[2]. The captain’s 
safety concern was only at its destination, not at takeoff seemingly. 
(2) If the punctuality were weighted, the safety would have obtained apparently. If not delayed by the 
replacement work, it would not fall in behind of the auspicious DC-10.  
(3) The metal strip, falling from the DC-10 engine, stayed at the 3.5 meters to the centerline, and it was 
just the half distance of the Concorde main wheel span. If the Concorde had gone slightly away, the wheel 
could not have rolled on it. The metal chip position at engine of DC-10 was 10.3 meters away to the 
runway centerline. However it stopped at the just position of Concorde wheels going. It disassembled from 
the DC-10 in high speed of motion, with jumping and running but stayed at its position. The killer metal 
stayed at the position only for the Concorde aircraft, not for other type such as B747and Tu144. 
The trajectory of the metal strip could not be computed because of the vertex behind of DC-10. The 
certain answer is that it was not a random event. The half main landing wheel distance is about 5.2 meters 
in DC-10, but the metal strip did not harm its own wheel. 
There was another example of reverser fault. A reverser of a B737 was locked by the maintenance 
engineer for its fault before flight, by noticing the pilots, but at landing the pilot forgot it and then the 
asymmetry force of braking made the B737 skid out of the runway but with none injuries. 
(4) The captain of the questioned Concorde aircraft had been a pilot of A340 aircraft. His time in type 
was only one year. But the first officer’s time in type was much longer. It was another non-coordinate, 
suggesting the lack of experience, and not proper crew membership. 
The surface reason had been written in the investigation reports, but it can not give the right answer to 
prevent such kind of accident. It can not teach other pilots to think of it. 
Aircraft DC-10 
There were some puzzling events related to the aircraft DC-10 as below. 
(1) Case 1. When a DC-10 aircraft was in high speed rolling on ground, one of its engines disassembled 
from its wing with shooting ahead and going upwards and then falling down on the runway. The tower 
controller (ATC) stared at it with astonishment without notice the pilots. Meanwhile the pilots did not 
1472  Wenzhi Zhao and Zhi Guo / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1469 – 14744 Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
know this situation. The aircraft was pulling up into climbing. Soon after, it crashed with all people 
onboard were killed. Because all the display was power just other engines, no automatic indications could 
reach to the pilots.
The investigation pointed out that if the ATC told the pilots to abort the takeoff, the disaster could have 
been avoided. 
(2) Case 2. An experienced captain was transferred to be the pilot of DC-10. When he observed the 
maneuvering systems in the tail apartment, he found problems. The parallel arrangement of its pipes was 
subjected to jam. It was a hiding danger. He got alerted. After he finished his fly training in the type 
simulator, he applied to try a chance of controlling this aircraft with the power of only the three engines. 
He set the scenarios and trained himself in three hours to get the controlling principle to land safely, 
and then he recorded his lessons. Three months later, in a passenger flight the rear cargo gate flew away 
causing the cabin floor to sink to jam the controlling systems. This event was more danger than his training 
scenario. He was calm and careful to use the engine power to control the aircraft at the help of the copilot, 
by deploying the throttle smoothly under his training theory. He finally brought the jeopardized DC-10 
aircraft to the ground safely with no injury, 100% survival. 
This case was not widely known for the rareness and for the non fatality; it just was an unsafe incident 
as a slight event.
However it is regarded here as a case of pre-sight by the comparisons as below. 
(3) Case 3. Still on the DC-10 passenger flight from Turkey to Europe，more than 300 passenger were 
aboard with about 10% over-loaded passengers, some of which sit on the floor. Its floor collapsed during 
the flight, and it got out of control to crash, with 0% survival. 
This case lacks the pre-sight in alert and in the overloaded.  
(4) Case 4. Also on the DC-10 passenger flight, near 300 passengers were aboard. The tail engine got 
fault causing all the surface control lost. Only the two remain engines were available in power. An 
instructor captain was just as a passenger. He went into the cockpit to help the pilots to fly with many 
observations of going to the rear part. The aircraft was difficult to operate at forced landing, and the wing 
touched the ground before the end of its runway with the consequence of disassembling to 5 parts, but with 
63% passenger survival. It was praised to be the most successful forced landing. 
This success was of the utility of the theory of Case 2. 
Aircraft Tu-154 cross-plugged 
The two plugs of flight control in aircraft Tu-154 were cross plugged by maintenance error. After 
climbing the autopilot was connected and then the aircraft got positive feedback with the increasing bank 
angle, leading to disassembling in the air, with all people on aboard killed. This accident was compiled into 
textbooks as a typical human error in maintenance work. 
If the pilot had had got the training lesson to disconnect the auto pilot just as the copilot suggested, the 
event would not have had happened. 
The maintenance technician was the only to be blamed for in text, but it was just one reason among 
other facts. The first was that the plug was designed in a simplified manner to be the same, not identical. 
And the training to technician and pilots was not in time. The second is that the pilot was absent to the 
training classes that day due to the stomachache, but not compensation lesson was done. The third reason 
was that the Captain turned down the copilot’s suggestion to disconnect the autopilot, a typical problem of 
the crew resource management (CRM). The fourth fact was that any one knows if some thing goes wrong, 
there must be some input stimulated. The pilot failed in the insensitive mode. It was just that he connected 
the autopilot that caused the unexpected motion of the aircraft. Not learn, not understanding, then beyond 
expecting.  
This case suggests that the pre-sight is lack at mind. 
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On the contrary there was a similar event that a pilot found during the approach when he lowered the 
flaps, the aircraft sudden lowered its nose, and then he retracted the flaps to getting the normal control. On 
the ground he got to know that it was the fourth times to happen, and other three events left neither 
survivors nor evidence. This pilot was sensitive. It was his pre-sight of control reactance saved himself and 
the flight passengers. 
2.2 The Analysis of Accidents 
It appears from the accidents of the Concorde aircraft that the preventions were good, but the pre-sight 
was worse. The pre-sight is vital, overweighting the preventions, because the replacement of the reverse 
was confirmed to be in vein.  
Though the FOD was so sudden, there were still two chances at least to stop its developing. The first 
chance is that the pilots aborted the takeoff as soon as possible when they sensed the abnormal in sound, 
vibrations and even at turning the engines off, according to his logic of absolute safety for the replacement 
of the reverser. 
Though it was in the higher speed rolling than V1 which is normally the last time to abort, the runway 
is still longer enough to stopping this aircraft in flames, with enough spaces or distance. The Concorde 
aircraft was controllable at first on the runway by obtaining enough support, without the requiring of the 
engine power too much. If it overran the runway, it would be in the lower speed, miner impact, higher 
survival rate, lighter loses, etc. 
The second chance was when the ATC found the smoke the ATC should have ordered it to stop at once 
instead of just notice. No plane can fly in this mode. 
The puzzling question was that the ATC was in an alternate duty. He was qualified controller, but 
probably he was not on his own cycle of career with the proper mental, physical, etc. It was he who could 
watch that scene so clear and have the ability to emit any order to GO or NOT GO. There was not another 
person to be expected at the system. 
However both the ATC and the pilot did not act properly. They did not know how to react at that time 
because of lack of pre-sight at mind. They had not such training then could only deal with the normal but 
not the dangerous. If the related people without the skills and knowledge, no improvement will be expected.  
The question is focused to no pre-sight. The lack of pre-sight may be in the ATC, pilot, system 
management, etc. The prevention mechanics was penetrated by the FOD and coincidences, as without 
preparation to it.  
The pre-sight is the only answer to the question as the safety not reached by the reverse replacement. 
There is an old saying in Chinese that “The pre-sight makes things up, and no pre-sight no success”. The 
pre-sight brings the preparations in mind may counteract the chaos. 
The pilots and the ATC are selected to be the wise person to cope with some complex situation, but 
some act not proper. If it were its first incident to meet, it would have be acceptable, but there were near 50 
events of tire, 5 of fuel leakage, just not the fire for the Concord aircraft. As a result of these events, the 
wheels and the tires were reinforced. It might be the reinforced tire debris to impact the tank to leak. Then 
the hidden danger got amplified, because the root problem was not overcame retracing into the improper 
design of the arrangement of the engines and the main landing gears.  
The FOD was not the first happen, there were bolts and nuts causing trouble before, but this time was 
the knife-like metal strip, with more killing threat. Such more dangerous consequences should have been 
anticipated by the view of changing. 
The fuel leakage was not first event either in the Concorde aircraft history. The first leakage made it 
return to its airport in 20 minutes. The narrow lucky chance would not give twice, if human did not absorb 
the before lessons.  
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If a voice of “stop” was heard in cockpit it might be of first officer or the flight engineer. If it were 
stopped it would be the typical success lesson. None concept of abortion in takeoff in mind leads the not 
understanding the real risk. The good chance was lost with so many lives. 
The aircraft was designed and made not perfectly, and the only remedy is to require the pilots and ATC 
to be skillful in operation and management system. Therefore they are chosen to the job to do the work 
better. 
Before the Concorde accident there were other events of rejected takeoff (RTO) among other aircrafts, 
some even more dangerous but with higher survival rate. A similar accidents existed related another supper 
sonic transporter in 1978, Tu144 which made a successful belly landing in the field after got more danger 
inner fire.  
The dealing with the incidents of the Concorde aircraft feels like the done by Robot. 
The pre-sight is not too high to reach, and the 100% and 63% of survival rate by DC-10 pilots said so, 
and the Tu144 test pilots as well. 
All cases above show the pre-sight important or vital, not only the theory in paper but also in practice. 
Many pre-sight are already fulfilling in the systems of the anti-collision, such as the TCAS and EGPWS. 
The pre-sight is a mode of thinking in not only science but also engineering practice especially in 
complex system. 
Passenger’s pre-sight also plays a role. It was know that an A320 aircraft was crashed in Pakistan on 
July 28th, 2010, with all on board was killed. But a passenger did NOT GO into the gate after he got the 
bad weather information of the destination, because he knows that the airport is among the mountains. 
3. Conclusions 
The pre-sight is vital to counteract the accident and risk, by bring out safer operations. It would be the 
common sense in science and engineering. As the system grows, some of the pre-sight are fixed as the 
regulations but not all. In the complex system like the air transportation, the pre-sight stays behind the 
coordination process. The pre-sight is the function requirement of the complex system, and it promotes 
control and management change with the environments. It is a tool to resolve the irresistible accidents not 
only for the air transportation, but also for the more general systems. 
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